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Abstract
In 2018, Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner published an article in
Nature Communications entitled ‘Quantum theory cannot consistently de-
scribe the use of itself.’ I clarify the significance of the result and point out a
common and persistent misunderstanding of the argument, which has been
attacked as flawed from a variety of interpretational perspectives.
In 2018, Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner published an article in Na-
ture Communications entitled ‘Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the
use of itself’ [1]. Here I want to point out a common misunderstanding of the
Frauchiger-Renner argument, which has been attacked as flawed from a variety of
interpretational perspectives.
As their Abstract states, Frauchiger and Renner propose ‘a Gedankenexperi-
ment to investigate the question whether quantum theory can, in principle, have
universal validity.’ Specifically, the issue is whether it is possible ‘to employ quan-
tum theory to model complex systems that include agents who are themselves
using quantum theory.’ The claim is that, given certain assumptions, the agents’
conclusions derived from quantum theory are inconsistent: ‘one agent, upon ob-
serving a particular measurement outcome, must conclude that another agent has
predicted the opposite outcome with certainty.’
The Gedankenexperiment is a variant of Wigner’s experiment in the well-
knownWigner’s Friend argument [3], modified by a construction by Hardy [4, 5].
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In Wigner’s experiment, the Friend measures the z-spin of a qubit in an isolated
laboratory L containing the qubit Q, the measuring apparatus A, and the Friend
F . After the measurement, the laboratory is in an entangled state ∣Ψ⟩L, a lin-
ear superposition of product states of the form ∣+⟩L = ∣ + 12⟩Q∣‘+’⟩A∣“+”⟩F and∣−⟩L = ∣ − 12⟩Q∣‘-’⟩A∣“-”⟩F , where ∣‘+’⟩A∣“+”⟩F and ∣‘-’⟩A∣“-”⟩F represents states
of the apparatus recording the +1
2
or −1
2
outcome and the Friend registering this
outcome. Wigner, outside the laboratory, is assumed to have the technological
ability to measure arbitrary observables of L, e.g., an observable with eigenstates
∣+⟩L, ∣−⟩L, or the observable represented by the projection operator onto the en-
tangled state ∣Ψ⟩L.
The Frauchiger-Renner Gedankenexperiment involves a timed sequence of
measurements by two Friends, F and F , and two Wigners, W and W . In ad-
dition to measurements, the agents make inferences about ‘certainty’ on the basis
of the measurement outcomes according to two rules, Q and C, and a third rule,
S, which prohibits inconsistent inferences and is not invoked until the last step of
the argument.
Rule Q: If an agent A has established that a quantum system Q is in a state
∣ψ⟩Q at time t0, and the Born probability of the outcome ξ of a measurement of
an observable X on Q in the state ∣ψ⟩ completed at time t is 1, then agent A can
conclude: ‘I am certain that x = ξ at time t.’
Rule C: If an agent A has established: ‘I am certain that another agent A′,
whose inferences about certainty are in accordance with Q,C, and S, is certain
that x = ξ at time t,’ then agent A can conclude: ‘I am certain that x = ξ at time t.’
Rule S: If an agent A has established ‘I am certain that x = ξ at time t,’ then
agent A cannot also establish ‘I am certain that x ≠ ξ at time t.’
As Frauchiger and Renner point out [1, p. 3], we should think of the agents
as quantum computers programmed to carry out the sequence of measurements in
the Gedankenexperiment, and to draw inferences about ‘certainty’ from the mea-
surement outcomes according to the rulesQ andC, constrained by the consistency
requirement, rule S. Each agent stores the statements established as ‘certain’ ac-
cording to these rules in an internal memory register. Inferences to ‘certainty’ are
licensed by the three rules and nothing more, and the significance of ‘being cer-
tain’ is implicit in the constraints defined by these rules and nothing more. The
goal here is to investigate the question whether it is possible ‘to employ quantum
theory to model complex systems that include agents who are themselves using
quantum theory.’ The rules are minimal assumptions about inferential moves by
agents using quantum theory.
The experiment is repeated over many rounds, n = 0,1,2, . . . until a halting
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condition is satisfied. A round lasts from n ∶ 00 to n ∶ 40, where the notation n ∶ xx
represents a ‘time’ in minutes (n) and seconds (xx). Here is the experimental
protocol:
At n ∶ 00, F invokes a randomness generator based on the measurement of a
quantum system,R, initially in a state ∣init⟩R =
√
1/3∣heads⟩R+
√
2/3∣tails⟩R. She
sets the spin of an electron, S, to ∣ ↓⟩S if r = heads or to ∣→⟩S =
√
1/2(∣ ↓⟩S+∣ ↑⟩S)
if r = tails, and sends S to F .
From n ∶ 01 to n ∶ 04, F uses rule Q to either establish as certain that w = fail
if the outcome of her measurement is r = tails, which she stores in her memory
register, or she draws no conclusion about the value w.
At n ∶ 10, F measures S with respect to the basis {∣ ↓⟩S, ∣ ↑⟩S} and records the
outcome z ∈ {−1
2
,+1
2
}.
From n ∶ 11 to n ∶ 14, F applies rule Q to establish as certain that r = tails
if the outcome of her spin measurement is z = +1
2
, and then applies rule C to
establish as certain that w = fail, which she stores in her memory register, or she
draws no conclusion about the value of w.
At n ∶ 20, W measures L with respect to a basis {∣ok⟩L =
√
1/2(∣h⟩L −
∣t⟩L), ∣fail⟩L =
√
1/2(∣h⟩L + ∣t⟩L)}. Here ∣h⟩L is the state that F ’s laboratory L
would evolve to at time n ∶ 20 if the initial state of R is ∣heads⟩R. This is the same
as the state of L after F completes her measurement of R and stores her inference
in her internal memory at n ∶ 04, since nothing happens to L between n ∶ 04 and
n ∶ 20. The state ∣t⟩L is defined similarly. He records w = ok or w = fail depend-
ing on the outcome. The record in W ’s memory register is available to outside
observers as an announcement or display, and also accessible byW .
From n ∶ 21 to n ∶ 24, W applies rule Q to establish as certain that z = +1
2
if
the outcome of his measurement is w = ok, and then applies rule C to establish
as certain that w = fail, which he stores in his memory register; he draws no
conclusion about the value of w if the outcome of his measurement is w = fail.
From n ∶ 26 to n ∶ 29,W accessesW ’s memory and either draws no conclusion
about the value of w ifW drew no conclusion or, ifW established as certain that
w = fail,W records as certain that w = fail using ruleC and stores the information
in his memory register.
At n ∶ 30, W measures L with respect to a basis {∣ok⟩L =
√
1/2(∣ − 1
2
⟩L − ∣ +
1
2
⟩L), ∣fail⟩L =
√
1/2(∣ − 1
2
⟩L + ∣ + 12⟩L)}. The states ∣ + 12⟩L and ∣ − 12⟩L of L are
defined similarly to ∣h⟩L and ∣t⟩L and correspond to the states ∣+⟩L and ∣−⟩L in the
above description of Wigner’s original thought experiment. The state ∣ + 1
2
⟩L is the
state that F ’s laboratory L would evolve to at time n ∶ 30 if the initial state of S is
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∣ ↑⟩S. This is the same as the state of L after F completes her spin measurement
and stores her inference in her internal memory at n ∶ 24, since nothing happens
to L between n ∶ 24 and n ∶ 30. The state −1
2
is defined similarly. He records
w = ok or w = fail depending on the outcome. The record inW ’s memory register
is available to outside observers.
From n ∶ 31 to n ∶ 34,W checks for consistency using rule S.
At n ∶ 40, the experiment is halted if w = ok and w = ok.
The whole point of the argument is to show that if agents, capable of per-
forming measurements on quantum systems and making inferences on the basis
of these measurements, are themselves modeled as quantum systems evolving
unitarily in accordance with the rules Q,C,S, then, for the particular Gedanken-
experiment considered, we end up with an inconsistency. So, it is crucial to the
argument that these computers and their memory registers are quantum systems
that evolve unitarily at all times.
Frauchiger and Renner [1, p. 2] point to the circuit diagram in the Methods
section as showing that each step of the experiment can be described by a unitary
evolution on a particular subsystem. A widely circulated but unpublished Note by
Renner [2] shows the unitary evolution in detail. With Renner’s permission, I will
follow the analysis in the Note.
Losada, Laura, and Lombardi [6] argue, using the ‘consistent histories’ ap-
proach to quantum mechanics, that ‘the supposedly contradictory conclusion of
the [Frauchiger-Renner] argument requires computing probabilities in a family of
histories that does not satisfy the consistency condition, i.e., an invalid family of
histories for the theory.’ As the authors note on p. 3, ‘a history is defined as a
sequence of events at different times, where an event is the occurrence of a prop-
erty.’ So what they show, in effect, is that an assignment of properties, or values to
the observables of the experiment, corresponding to the steps in the argument, is
not a consistent history. But this is irrelevant to the Frauchiger-Renner argument.
The Frauchiger-Renner argument does not assume, nor needs to assume, any-
thing about the assignment of values to observables—in particular, the argument
does not assume that observable values are relative to an agent. The entire ar-
gument is framed in terms of measurement outcomes, and what the agents can be
‘certain’ about at various times according to the rules Q,C and S, which is what
the agents store in their memory registers.
What comes to much the same thing is the claim that the argument assumes
that when an agent in an isolated laboratory performs a measurement, the state
collapses inside the laboratory, but not outside. Mucin˜o and Okon [7] argue that,
in addition to the three rules, Frauchiger and Renner implicitly invoke the assump-
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tion:
(H) When a measurement is carried out inside of a closed lab, such a
measurement leads to a collapse for inside observers, but it does not
lead to a collapse for outside observers.
The Frauchiger-Renner argument does not assume, nor needs to assume, any-
thing other than a successive unitary evolution of the global quantum state through
each stage of the experiment—in particular, the argument does not assume that the
quantum state undergoes a ‘collapse’ for observers inside a laboratory but not for
outside observers.
The first step in the experiment isF ’s generation of the random number ‘heads’
or ‘tails’ at n ∶ 00 by measuring the system R initially in the state ∣init⟩R =√
2/3∣tails⟩R +
√
1/3∣heads⟩R, and F ’s subsequent preparation of the spin state
of the electron S in the state ∣ ↓⟩S or ∣→⟩S , which she sends to F ’s laboratory L.
From n ∶ 01 to n ∶ 04, F infers (establishes as certain) that w = fail at n ∶ 31
if she sent S to L in the state ∣ →⟩S , because in that case the state of L at n ∶ 30
(after F ’s spin measurement) would be orthogonal to ∣ok⟩; otherwise she draws no
conclusion about w. Any action performed by F that has the effect of mapping or-
thogonal states to orthogonal states can be modeled as a unitary evolution, which
in general produces an entangled state. In this case, F ’s measurement, followed
by her inference to ‘w = fail at n ∶ 31,’ or a null inference to ‘no conclusion drawn,’
can be modeled as a unitary evolution entangling the content of F ’s memory reg-
ister with the spin state of S and the output r of the randomness generator. The
entangled state expresses a correlation, between the value of r, the prepared state
of S, and F ’s prediction (either “w = fail at n ∶ 31,’ or ‘no conclusion drawn’).
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the initial state of F ’s memory
register is some ready state ∣⟩F and the initial state of S is ∣ ↑⟩S. The unitary
describing F ’s measurement completed at n ∶ 01, followed by her inference com-
pleted at n ∶ 02, is defined by its effect on orthogonal states:
∣tails⟩R∣⟩F ∣ ↑⟩S ↦ ∣tails⟩R∣“r = tails, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩F ∣→⟩S
∣heads⟩R∣⟩F ∣ ↑⟩S ↦ ∣heads⟩R∣“r = tails, so no conclusion drawn”⟩F ∣ ↓⟩S (1)
Applying this unitary results in the transition
∣init⟩R∣⟩F ∣ ↑⟩S ↦ ∣Ψ⟩n∶02 =
√
2/3∣tails⟩R∣“r = tails, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩F ∣→⟩S
+√1/3∣heads⟩R∣“r = heads, so no conclusion drawn”⟩F ∣ ↓⟩S (2)
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The global state, initially a product state ∣Ψ⟩n∶00 = ∣init⟩R∣⟩F ∣ ↑⟩S ∣⟩F ∣⟩W ∣⟩W
at the beginning of each round n of the experiment, evolves unitarily to the entan-
gled state ∣Ψ⟩n∶02 on the basis of transformation rules intended to model measure-
ments and inferential moves following the registration of a measurement outcome
by a human agent using quantum theory. The sequence of subsequent measure-
ments and inferences can all be modeled as unitary transformations in a similar
way, as Renner shows in [2]. The following is a close summary of Renner’s anal-
ysis. Only the relevant entangled component is explicitly indicated at each stage.
Consider F ’s reasoning on the basis of observing z = −1
2
or z = +1
2
. If r =
heads, F prepares S in the state ∣ ↓⟩S . In that case, F ’s measurement will yield
z = −1
2
. So if F observes z = +1
2
, she concludes via rule Q that r ≠ heads,
i.e., r = tails. If she observes z = −1
2
, she can’t draw any conclusion about r. This
inference can be characterized by the following unitary, which acts on F ’s internal
memory register, FM :
∣“I observed z = + 1
2
”⟩F ∣⟩FM ↦ ∣“I observed z = + 12 ”⟩F ∣“I am certain that r = tails”⟩FM
∣“I observed z = + − 1
2
”⟩F ∣⟩FM ↦ ∣“I observed z = − 12 ”⟩F ∣“no conclusion drawn”⟩FM (3)
which can be expressed more simply as
∣“I observed z = + 1
2
”⟩F ↦ ∣“I observed z = + 12 , so I am certain that r = tails”⟩F
∣“I observed z = − 1
2
”⟩F ↦ ∣“I observed z = − 12 ; no conclusion drawn”⟩F (4)
or simply as
∣“z = + 1
2
”⟩F ↦ ∣‘ z = + 12 , so I am certain that r = tails”⟩F
∣“z = − 1
2
”⟩F ↦ ∣“z = − 12 ; no conclusion drawn”⟩F (5)
F ’s inference between n ∶ 11 and n ∶ 12 is described by this unitary, resulting
in the transition to the state
∣Ψ⟩n∶12 = √1/3∣tails⟩R∣“r = tails, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩F ∣ ↑⟩S ∣“z = + 12 , so I am certain that r = tails”⟩F
+√1/3∣tails⟩R∣“r = tails, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩F ∣ ↓⟩S ∣“z = − 12 ; no conclusion drawn”⟩F
+√1/3∣heads⟩R∣“r = heads, so no conclusion drawn”⟩F ∣ ↓⟩S ∣“z = − 12 ; no conclusion drawn”⟩F (6)
A further unitary, implementing an inference via rule C from F ’s inference about
w at n ∶ 31 to F ’s certainty that w = fail at n ∶ 31 or a null inference to ‘no
6
conclusion drawn,’ results in the state
∣ψ⟩n∶14 = √1/3∣tails⟩R∣“r = tails, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩F ∣ ↑⟩S ∣“z = + 12 , so I am certain that w = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩F
+√1/3∣tails⟩R∣“r = tails, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩F ∣ ↓⟩S ∣“I observed z = − 12 ; no conclusion drawn”⟩F
+√1/3∣heads⟩R∣“r = heads, so no conclusion drawn”⟩F ∣ ↓⟩S ∣“I observed z = − 12 ; no conclusion drawn”⟩F (7)
Continuing in this way, and transforming to the basis {∣ok⟩, ∣fail⟩} of L de-
fined in the experimental protocol above, we find that afterW ’s measurement and
inferences from the outcome of his measurement (to F ’s certainty about z via rule
Q, and hence from F ’s certainty about w at n ∶ 31 to W ’s certainty about w at
n ∶ 31 via rule C, or to ‘no conclusion drawn’), the global state has the form
∣Ψ⟩n∶24 = √1/6∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣ ↑⟩S ∣“z = + 12 , so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩F
−√1/6∣ok⟩L∣“w = ok, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩W ∣ ↑⟩S ∣“z = + 12 , so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩F
+√2/3∣fail⟩L∣“w = ok; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣ ↓⟩S ∣“z = − 12 ; no conclusion drawn”⟩F (8)
Note that while F ’s certainty (at n ∶ 14) that w = fail at n ∶ 31 relies on F ’s
certainty (at n ∶ 02), and F ’s memory is erased byW ’s measurement ofL at n ∶ 20,
W relies on F ’s memory to infer certainty that w = fail at n ∶ 31, not F ’s memory,
and F ’s memory is not altered byW ’s measurement.
Just before n ∶ 30, the global state in the basis {∣ok⟩, ∣fail⟩} of L, defined in the
experimental protocl, can be expressed as
∣Ψ⟩n∶25 = √1/12∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣fail⟩L
−√1/12∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣ok⟩L
−√1/12∣ok⟩L∣“w = ok, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩W ∣fail⟩L
+√1/12∣ok⟩L∣“w = ok, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩W ∣ok⟩L
+√1/3∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣fail⟩L
+√1/3∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣ok⟩L (9)
At n ∶ 27, W accesses W ’s memory to learn the contents, and at n ∶ 28 he
uses rule C to infer ‘I am certain that w = fail at n ∶ 31,’ or the null inference ‘no
conclusion drawn,’ which he writes in his internal memory, resulting in a unitary
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evolution to the state
∣Ψ⟩n∶28 = √1/12∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣fail⟩L∣“no conclusion drawn”⟩W
−√1/12∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣ok⟩L∣“no conclusion drawn”⟩W
−√1/12∣ok⟩L∣“w = ok, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩W ∣fail⟩L∣“I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩W
+√1/12∣ok⟩L∣“w = ok, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩W ∣ok⟩L∣“I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩W
+√1/3∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣fail⟩L∣“no conclusion drawn”⟩W
+√1/3∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣ok⟩L∣“no conclusion drawn”⟩W (10)
Finally, afterW ’s measurement, the global state is
∣Ψ⟩n∶31 = √1/12∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣fail⟩L∣“no conclusion drawn previously; now I observe w = fail”⟩W
−√1/12∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣ok⟩L∣“no conclusion drawn previously; now I observew = ok”⟩W
−√1/12∣ok⟩L∣“w = ok, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩W ∣fail⟩L∣“I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31; now I observew = fail”⟩W
+√1/12∣ok⟩L∣“w = ok, so I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31”⟩W ∣ok⟩L∣“I am certain thatw = fail at n ∶ 31; now I observew = ok”⟩W
+√1/3∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣fail⟩L∣“no conclusion drawn previously; now I observe w = fail”⟩W
+√1/3∣fail⟩L∣“w = fail; no conclusion drawn”⟩W ∣ok⟩L∣“no conclusion drawn previously; now I observew = ok”⟩W (11)
The rules about ‘certainty’ license time-stamped entries in the memory regis-
ters of the agents. According to the state ∣Ψ⟩n∶31, for each round n there is a finite
probability, specifically 1/12, thatW ’s internal memory registers w = fail as well
as the observation of the measurement outcome w = ok. With probability 1 this
will occur for some round. If we assume that an agent can conclude: ‘I am certain
that x = ξ at time t’ if the agent observes x = ξ in a measurement completed at
time t (which is not explicitly stated as one of the rules, but should be understood
as part of rule Q), then the argument shows that the rules are inconsistent: apply-
ing rules Q and C to the Gedankenexperiment, (and assuming the implicit rule
about measurement justifying certainty) leads to a violation of rule S.
One might object that the inconsistency here is not a logical contradiction, be-
cause that would involve the demonstration of statements p and not-p from Q and
C, which is not the same thing as deriving ‘I am certain that p’ and ‘I am certain
that not-p.’ Rule S excludes such conflicting modal statements about certainty, but
whether modal statements are contradictory depends on the system of modal logic.
This objection misses the point. If we think of the agents as quantum automata or
quantum computers, the rules about ‘certainty’ simply justify timed entries in the
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memory registers. Rule S prohibits conflicting entries with the same time stamp,
and the derivation of a conflict for a particular experimental scenario provides a
counterexample to the possibility of applying quantum theory ‘to model complex
systems that include agents who are themselves using quantum theory.’ How else
would one investigate such a question?
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Renato Renner for helpful discussions, and for making available his
‘Notes on the Discussion of “Quantum theory cannot consistently describe the
use of itself.’
References
[1] Daniela Frauchiger and Renato Renner (2018), ‘Quantum theory cannot con-
sistently describe the use of itself.’ Nature Communications 9, article number
3711.
[2] Renato Renner, ‘Notes on the discussion: “Quantum theory cannot consis-
tently describe the use of itself.”’ Unpublished, used with permission.
[3] Eugene Wigner, “Remarks on the mind-body question,’ in I.J. Good (ed.),
The Scientist Speculates (Heinemann, London, 1961).
[4] Lucien Hardy, ‘Quantum mechanics, local realistic theories, and Lorentz-
invariant physical theories,’ Physical Review Letters 68, 2981–2984 (1992).
[5] Lucien Hardy, ‘Nonlocality for two particles without inequalities for almost
all entangled states,’ Physical Review Letters 71, 1665–1668 (1993).
[6] Marcelo Losada, Roberto Laura, and Olimpia Lombardi, ‘Frauchiger-
Renner argument and quantum histories.’ Physical Review A 100, 052114–
052119 (2019).
[7] R. Mucin˜o and E Okon, ‘Wigner’s convoluted friends,’ arXiv:2006.16056
[quant-ph].
9
